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L Introduction
According to the "rule of law tradition," the Supreme Court discovers the
meaning of the Constitution and its Amendments through a closed system of
"general, impartial and fixed rules."3 This reified concept of constitutional
interpretation' masks the dynamics of judicial decision making: Supreme Court
rulings are more than interpretations of the Constitution; they are authoritative
constructions of social reality. In Supreme Court decision making, the line between
what "is" and what "ought to be," between "reflection" and "creation," is illusive
because each Justice does not "find" the law but instead employs interconnected
assumptions and shared meanings about the issues before the Court.' Given the
3. CRAIG DUCAT, MODES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 45 (1978). Ducat wrote:
It [the rule of law tradition] is customarily contrasted with the Rule of Men, generally
with pejorative effect to the latter. While the Rule of Law mandates the decision of
controversies objectively according to general, impartial, and fixed rules which do not
acknowledge the individual identity of or personal consequences for particular litigants
before the court, the Rule of Men implies that judgments in individual cases are otherwise
politically motivated ....
Id. at 44.
Professor Ronald Dworkin described two models of the rule of law. The frst is the "rule-book"
model, in which government and individual must abide by legal rules regardless of their content.
RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 11 (1986). The second model, the "'rights' conception,"
posits that "the rules in the rule book [must] capture and enforce moral rights." Id. at 12.
The rule of law tradition arises from English common law. By the eighteenth century, common law
judges posited that their judgments arose from common societal norms rather than their own
predilections. See WILLIAM CHAMBiLs & ROBERT SEDMAN, LAW, ORDER, AND POWER 58 (2d ed. 1982).
Juxtaposed to the rule of law tradition is legal realism, which posits that judicial decisions are
grounded on emotions, intuition, and prejudice, making it impossible to predict what judges will do. See
Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 33-41 (1931). Frank argued that this
uncertainty was concealed by the rule of law tradition to the disservice of democracy, "[f]or, in a
democracy, the courts belong not to the judges and the lawyers, but to the citizens." JEROME FRANK,
COURTS ON TRIAL 429 (1949).
4. "The very idea of a government of laws, rather than men, rests on the wrongheaded premise that
social structures have an objective existence that enables them to exert power over individuals. Ultra-
theorists condemn the premise as an instance of the mistake of reification." ANDREW ALTMAN. CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITQUE 168 (1998). Reification is "the apprehension of the products of
human activity as if they were something else than human products - such as the facts of nature, results
of cosmic laws or manifestations of divine will." PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 89 (1967).
5. Sociologists Peter Berger and Hansfied Kellner contended that "human phenomena does not speak
for themselves; they must be interpreted." PETER BERGER & HANSPiED KELLNER, SOCIOLOGY
REINTERPRETED 10 (1981). In other words, social life is a subjective experience, i.e., an act of
interpretation. Each person, then, constructs his or her own social reality. In making such interpretations
of social reality, one cannot suspend value judgments. Because the rule of law tradition fails to
acknowledge this, it cannot clarify the inherent moral choices that must be made in judicial decision
making. Human meaning thus becomes constructed even though the participants may be ignorant of the
moral choices behind their interpretation. See id. at 56-90 (discussing the relativity of social knowledge);
see also CARTER, supra note 2, at 65 ("A legal scholar who said he discovered the intent of the framers
would more honestly have to say that he created a version of their intent from the symbolic material that
has meaning to him.").
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authoritative nature of judicial pronouncements,6 these assumptions and shared
meanings can be determinative of what is perceived as social reality.
This Article argues that the Supreme Court has constructed as social reality a set
of assumptions about imprisonment that renders inmates unworthy of meaningful
constitutional safeguards. The Court has isolated inmates from the body politic by
positing that the "[reasonableness] standard of review.., applies in all circumstan-
ces in which the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights."7
Rather than subjecting prison rules to a skepticism worthy of a theory of rights, the
Supreme Court imposes a presumption of their constitutionality - even when they
significantly curtail fundamental rights. Consequently, the judiciary leaves inmates
with scant protection from the excesses and abuses of their keepers.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the evolution of the prison
from a largely autonomous, feudal-like entity into a bureaucratic organization The
6. See Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticisrm, 86 MIcH. L. REv. 827, 842-43 (1988).
Posner wrote:
Judicial authority is essentially political: decisions are authoritative because they emanate
from a politically authorized source rather than because they are agreed to be correct by
persons in whom the community reposes ... trust. The political connotations of the word
"authoritative" are apt; the work evokes power and submission, not truth and conviction.
Id.
7. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990) (emphasis added).
8. In their constitutional context, not all rights are equal. Some have preferred status, which courts
have deemed "fundamental," that is, "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut,
301 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). Courts have incorporated fundamental rights into the Due Process Cause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and thus have made them applicable to the states. See, e.g., Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976) (ruling that free speech constitutes a fundamental right); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (ruling that travel constitutes a fundamental right); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (ruling that marriage constitutes a fundamental right); Harper v. Virginia
State Bd. of Educ., 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (ruling that the right to vote constitutes a fundamental
right); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (ruling that privacy constitutes a fundamental
right); Sherbert v. Verer, 374 U.S. 408-09 (1963) (ruling that religion constitutes a fundamental right);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-20 (1956) (ruling that appeal of a criminal conviction constitutes a
fundamental right) (Black & Frankfurter, J.J., concurring); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942) (ruling that procreation constitutes a fundamental right); see also LAURENCE H. TRme, AMERICAN
CONS'rrumoNAL LAW 772-74 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the process of selective incorporation). The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from "depriv[ing] any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
9. A bureaucratic organization is characterized by the following components:
1. Rulification and routinization. Organizations stress continuity. Rules save effort by
eliminating the need to derive a new solution for every situation. They also facilitate
standard and equal treatment of similar situations.
2. Division of Labor. Labor division involves marking off performance functions as
part of a systematic division of labor and providing the necessary authority to perform
those functions.
3. Hierarchy of authority. The organization of offices follows the principle of
hierarchy; each office is under the control and supervision of a higher one.
4. Expertise. Specialized training is necessary.... [N]ormally [then] only a person
who has demonstrated an adequate technical training is qualified to be a member of the
administrative staff.
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prison begins the new millennium as a rule-bound, but nonetheless authoritarian,
institution.
Part LI chronicles the Supreme Court's review of prison rules via the rational-
basis test. Once "beyond the ken of the courts,"'" the prison has emerged from a
tumultuous century with a powerful ally - the Supreme Court of the United States.
Part IV argues that the application of the rational-basis test to inmates rests on
a distorted view of the bureaucratic prison. In holding that their fundamental rights
merit minimal scrutiny, the Court has advanced a skewed portrait of the keepers and
the kept.
In light of the conclusions drawn thus far in the Article, Part V asserts that the
bureaucratic prison and its constitutional edifice - the rational-basis test - arose
from a legitimation crisis threatening the prison during the 1960s. Thereafter, the
courts constitutionalized imprisonment and thereby re-legitimated its control of the
underclass, the social junk of advanced capitalism.
Part VI posits three operational principles that should guide the courts in
reviewing prison rules. This component of the Article contends that imprisonment
ought to represent the punishment of last resort; and when incarceration occurs, it
ought to be of the least restrictive form. Moreover, a new penal philosophy - one
based on restorative justice - should redefine the role of the prison.
II. The Etiology of Prison Rules
Until the 1960s, legislatures and courts allowed wardens to run largely
autonomous prisons. Consequently, wardens promulgated rules for inmates as they
saw fit. Bureaucratic authority" eventually dominated the governance of prisons,
but it did not alter the pains of imprisonment. Prisons continued to function as
authoritarian, repressive "total institutions."'2
5. Written rules. Administrative acts, decisions, and rules are formulated and recorded
in writing.
KENNam J. PEAK, JusTicE ADMNuisTRATiON 23 (2d ed. 1998) (footnote omitted).
10. See Notes and Comments, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to
Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.I. 506, 507 (1963) (concluding that courts followed the
"hands-off" doctrine, leaving prisoners "without enforceable rights").
11. Roberto Unger juxtaposed three concepts of lawful authority. One is customary law, which
consists of "characteristically inarticulate" yet narrowly applied standards of conduct. ROBERTO
MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SociEmY 50 (1975). Unger indicated that customary law is
.spontaneously produced by society." Id. at 51. Bureaucratic (or regulatory) law is the second type. It
arises from the state and is composed of "explicit prescriptions, prohibitions, or permissions, addressed
to more or less general categories of persons and acts." Id The third type of law is "the legal order or
legal system." Id. at 52. Its rules are general and applied by autonomous bodies that are staffed by
specialized groups. See id. at 53.
12. ERVING GOFFMAN, AsYLuMs 6 (1961). Goffman wrote:
The central feature of total institutions can be described as a breakdown of the barriers
ordinarily separating these three spheres of life. First, all aspects of life are conducted in
the same place and under the same single authority. Second, each phase of the member's
daily activity is carried on in the immediate company of a large batch of others, all of
whom are treated alike and required to do the same thing together. Third, all phases of
[Vol. 53:161
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A. The Rise of the Bureaucratic Prison
Well into the twentieth century, state governments delegated extensive authority
to prison wardens and asked for little accountability in return. 3 Wardens seized
this opportunity:
Historically, the management of prison business has been centered
around the personal goals and powers of the warden and a deputy
warden or principle keeper who served as chief disciplinarian and top
security officer. Literature describing early prison wardens presents the
image of autocratic, sometimes charismatic figures who commanded the
obedience and loyal of rank and file custodians. Until the courts
abandoned their hands-off policy, wardens and their deputies held nearly
unlimited authority to administer their own system of punishments and
rewards. 4
Nevertheless, these early prisons did not necessarily lack rules. Some wardens
chose to promulgate few rules; 5 others imposed a plethora. 6 Both extremes
functioned to give vast authority to the staff with one overriding purpose - control
of the inmate population. 7
the day's activities are tightly scheduled.... Finally, the various enforced activities are
brought together into a single rational plan purportedly designed to fulfill the official aims
of the institution.
Id.
13. See, e.g., Jonathan Brant, Prison Disciplinary Procedures: Creating Rules, 21 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
83, 83 (1972) (observing that state delegations of power to wardens lacked "apparent restrictions");
Walter L Dickey, The Promise and Problems of Rulemaking in Corrections: The Wisconsin Experience,
1983 WISC. L. REV. 285, 288-89 (observing that state legislators adopted a "hands-off' approach to
prisons); W. Anthony Fitch & Julian Tepper, Structuring Correctional Decision Making: A Traditional
Proposal, 22 CATH. U. L. REV. 774,789-90 (1973) (observing that "the statutes governing correctional
endeavors ... are extremely vague;" "a tabula rasa"); James E. Robertson, Impartiality and Prison
Disciplinary Tribunals, 17 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 301, 305 n.20 (1991)
(observing that "state legislators delegated broad powers").
14. JAMEs Fox, ORGANIZATIONAL AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN MAXIMUM-SECURITY PRISONS 13
(1982) (footnotes omitted).
15. See, e.g., Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402, 411 (E.D. Okla. 1974) (finding that inmates
were punished for unlisted offenses in an Oklahoma prison); Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F. Supp. 411,414
(N.D. Tex. 1972) (finding no written rules in the Dallas jail), affd in part and vacated in part, 499 F.2d
367 (5th Cir. 1974); Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F. Supp. 1123, 1128 (E.D. La. 1971) (finding no written
rules in a Louisiana prison).
16. See, e.g., Bruce R. Jacob, Prison Discipline and Inmate Rights, 5 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 227,
237 (1970) (observing that a Tennessee prison had over 300 rules and warned that "[t]his list is not
comprehensive").
17. See Richard McCleery, Communication Patterns as a Bases of Systems of Authority, in
THEORETICAL STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PRISON 49, 52 (Richard A. Cloward et
al. eds., 1960) ("Control, rather than 'justice' in the familiar sense, was the object. Hence, there was no
place for a body of principles or 'constitutional' rights to restrain disciplinary procedure."); cf. RESOURCE
CTR. ON CORRECTIONAL LAW & LEGAL SERvS., ABA COMM'N ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES & SERVS.,
SURVEY OF PRISON DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES 21 (1974) (characterizing the prison
rules of 41 states as often "so vague and indefinite that it is difficult to differentiate between what might
20001
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James Jacobs' classic social history of Illinois' Stateville Prison illustrates the use
of prison rules." Jacobs observed that Stateville, during the wardenship of Joseph
Regan (1936-61), imposed so many prison rules that inmates could not hope to obey
them all. 9 This led staff to make "innumerable [unofficial] exceptions" in
exchange for inmate cooperation.' While to some outsiders Stateville epitomized
good order, Jacobs found a corrupted order: "The captains' [inmate-]clerks couldn't
be 'busted' and there were other 'untouchables' throughout the prison whose
inviolability was based upon stooling, indispensability, or personal relationships with
the staff. This led to an arbitrary system of justice, whereby overlooking infractions
was a reciprocity for certain inmate compliance. . .. "'
Regan did not have to fear that courts, legislatures, or other governmental
agencies would oversee his prison. They had embraced a hands-off approach to
prison practices.' Stateville's Regan, as well as other wardens across the nation,
thus had a free hand to suppress any dissent coming from within the prison.
Regan's successors could not maintain the autonomy he had established. The
barriers separating society from prisons collapsed during the 1960s.' Judicial and
legislative oversight entered prison walls for the first time and not far behind came
bureaucratic methods of management.' By the 1970s, the state legislature installed
a state department of corrections, leading to centralized authority over the state's
once largely autonomous prisons' In turn, university-educated, professional elites
secured high-ranking administrative positions in Stateville and the department of
corrections.'
B. Contemporary Prison Rules
Like the Stateville of old, the contemporary prison envelops its inhabitants in
a myriad of rules.' As John Irwin and James Austin observed:
be permitted and what might constitute a violation").
18. See generally JAMES B. JACOBS, STAThviLLE (1977) [hereinafter JACOBS, STATEVILLE].
19. See id. at 42.
20. Id. at 43.
21. d at 42-43.
22. See id at 31-37; see also infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text (discussing the hands-off
doctrine).
23. See JACOBS, STATEVILLE, supra note 18, at 37; cf. MICHAEL WELCH, CORRECTIONS 356 (1996)
(stating that until the 1960s staff ran prisons "free from constraints"); James E. Robertson, Judicial
Review of Prison Discipline in the United States and England: A Comparative Study of Due Process and
Natural Justice, 26 AM. Cium. L. REv. 1323, 1328 (1989) ("Corrections officials exercised virtually
unlimited power over inmates prior to the 1970s.") (footnote omitted).
24. See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text (discussing the demise of the hands-off doctrine).
25. See JACOBS, STATEVILLE, supra note 18, at 54-70.
26. See id, at 73-104.
27. See id.
28. See, e.g., COLORADO DEPot OF CORRECTIONS, CODE OF PRISON DISCIPLNE 9-20 (Sept. 1, 1999)
[hereinafter COLO. CODE OF PRISON DISCIPLINE] (listing 56 prohibited acts); MICHIGAN DEPT OF
CORRECTIONS, PRISONER GUIDEBOOK 7-15 (1999) [hereinafter MICH. PRISONER GUIDEBOOK] (listing over
30 prohibited acts); Mississippi DEPFr OF CORRECTIONS, INMATE HANDBOOK 47-50 (Aug. 1999)
[hereinafter MIss. INMATE HANDBOOK] (listing 36 prohibited acts); MONTANA DEr'r OF CORRECTIONS,
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The lines of authority, as well as the procedures, prescriptions, or
guidelines for all practices, are formalized in the written rules and
regulations appearing in elaborate manuals. An extensive and profes-
sionalized training program is needed to keep abreast of the most
recent changes in an increasingly complex array of administrative
regulations imposed by the central office. 9
1. The Scope of Prison Rules
Prison rules are wide-ranging in scope. Their subject~matter includes: (1)
access to legal materials and the media; (2) grievance procedures; (3) mail and
publication policy; (4) visiting; (5) cell furnishings; (6) prisoner funds; (7)
property control; (8) program classification; (9) work assignments and wages; (10)
good time; (11) disciplinary and grievance procedures; (12) drug testing; (13)
prisoner organizations; (14) housekeeping responsibilities; and (15) smoking
policy."0
The most important category of prison rules addresses discipline. Disciplinary
rules address a broad range of prohibited conduct, including institutional security;
property; contraband; movement; safety and health; and miscellaneous matters,
e.g., refusal to work or attend school.'
Disciplinary rules are proscriptive and punitive and thus resemble the criminal
law. Many mirror malum in se criminal offenses, such as rape and murder." But
PolicY No.: DOC 3.4.2 (Jan. 4, 1996) [hereinafter MONT. POLICY No.: DOC 3.4.2] (listing 47
prohibited acts); NEBRASKA DEPer OF CORRECTIONAL SERVS., RULES AND REGULATIONS 17-23
[hereinafter NEB. RULES & REGULATIONS] (listing 45 prohibitions); NEW HAMPSHIRE DEP'r OF
CORRECTIONS, MANUAL FOR THE GUIDANCE OF INMATES 16-20 (1998) [hereinafter N.H. MANUAL FOR
INMATES] (listing 78 prohibited acts); RHODE ISLAND DEP'r OF CORRECTIONS, ADULT CORRECTIONAL
INSTrUTIONS INTAKE SERVICE CENTER 18-20 (1999-2000) [hereinafter R.I. INTAKE SERVICE CENTER]
(listing 47 prohibited acts); TENNESSEE DEPt OF CORRECTION, INMATE RULES AND REGULATIONS 5-10
(Mar. 1999) [hereinafter TENN. RULES & REGULATIONS] (listing 74 prohibited acts); UTAH DEP' " OF
CORRECTIONS, INMATE ORIENTATION HANDBOOK 8-13 (n.d.) [hereinafter UTAH INMATE HANDBOOK]
(listing 62 prohibited acts).
29. JOHN IRWIN & JAMES AUSTIN, IT'S ABOUr TIME 69 (2d ed. 1997).
30. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE DIRECTOR OF
CORRECTIONS (July 31, 1999) [hereinafter CAL. RULES & REGULATIoNS] (div. 3, ch. 1 of tit. 15, "Crime
Prevention and Corrections," of the California Code of Regulations); MISS. INMATE HANDBOOK, supra
note 28; NEB. RULES & REGULATIONS, supra note 28; N.H. MANUAL FOR INMATES, supra note 28; R.I.
INTAKE SERVICE CENTER, supra note 28; S.D. DEPrT OF CORRECTIONS, INMATE LIVING GUIDE (Nov.
1996) [hereinafter S.D. INMATE GUIDE]; TENN. RULES & REGULATIONS, supra note 28; UTAH INMATE
HANDBOOK, supra note 28.
31. See, e.g., COLO. CODE OF PRISON DISCIPLINE, supra note 28, at 9-20; CONNECTICUT DEPI OF
CORRECTION, ADMIN. DIRECTIVE 9.5, CODE OF PENAL DISCIPLINE 9 (Jan. 12, 1998); KENTUCKY DEPT"
OF CORRECTIONS, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, POLICY No. 15.2, OFFENSES AND PENALTIES, at 2-10
(July 13, 1998) [hereinafter KY. POLICY No. 15.2]; MICH. PRISONER GUIDEBOOK, supra note 28, at 7-15;
MISS. INMATE HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 47-50; MONT. POLICY No.: DOC 3.4.2, supra note 28;
NEB. RULES & REGULATIONS, supra note 28, at 17-23; N.H. MANUAL FOR INMATES, supra note 28; R.I.
INTAKE SERVICE CENTER, supra note 28, at 46-48; TENN. RULES & REGULATIONS, supra note 28, at 5-
10; VERMONT DEPIt OF CORRECTIONS, DIRECTIVE 410.01: DISCaPLINE app. 1, at 6 (rev. June 3, 1996).
32. See, e.g., MICH. PRISONER GUIDEBOOK, supra note 28, at 7-15 (listing, e.g., homicide, assault
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2000
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
the great bulk of prohibitions lack a counterpart in the criminal law and are
peculiar to life in "total institutions," 3 whose inhabitants experience round-the-
clock scrutiny by their keepers.
Correctional officers retain extensive discretion in the enforcement of dis-
ciplinary rules, choosing to overlook many violations." The type of infraction,36
the alleged rule violator's race," and his or her prior disciplinary record" bear
significantly on the officers' selective enforcement of these rules.
A Bureau of Justice Statistics study found recorded rule violations com-
monplace, with each inmate committing on average 1.5 violations in 1986."9
Prison disciplinary tribunals convicted about half of all male state prisoners and
43% of female state prisoners of one or more rule violations during their
imprisonment.'
Prison staff can utilize a variety of sanctions upon rule violators.4' The most
and battery, sexual assault, bribery, and theft); MONT. POuCY No.: DOC 3.4.2, supra note 28 (listing,
e.g., homicide, threats, assault, extortion, and blackmail); NEB. RULES & REGULATIONS, supra note 28,
at 17-23 (listing, e.g., murder, bribery, and assault); TENN. RULEs & REGULATIONS, supra note 28, at
5-10 (listing, e.g., arson, assault, burglary, possession or selling of drugs, extortion, indecent exposure,
and arson).
33. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (defining "total institutions").
34. See, e.g., COLO. CODE OF PRISON DISCIPLINE, supra note 28, at 9-20 (listing, e.g., abuse of
medication, interference with a search, and failure to work); KY. POLICY NO. 15.2, supra note 31, at 2-10
(listing, e.g., refusing to obey an order, failure to pass bed inspection, and lying to staff); MICH.
PRISONER GUIDEBOOK, supra note 28, at 7-15 (listing, e.g., failure to disperse, interference with the
administration of rules, insolence, failure to maintain employment, possession of money, unauthorized
occupation of a cell or room, horseplay, and lying to an employee); MONT. POLICY No.: DOC 3.4.2,
supra note 28 (listing, e.g., lying, insolence, and failure to report); NEB. RULES & REGULATIONS, supra
note 28, at 17-23 (listing, e.g., tattoo activities, flare of tempers, and violation of signed program
agreement); N.H. MANUAL FOR INMATES, supra note 28, at 16-20 (listing, e.g., engaging in any sexual
contact, insubordination to a staff member, possession of any material to construct a mask, wig or
disguise, and tattooing); TENN. RULES & REGULATIONS, supra note 28, at 5-10 (listing, e.g., abuse of
telephone privileges, disrespect, dress code violations, failure to report, horseplay, and receiving two food
trays).
35. See John D. Hewitt et al., Self-Reported and Observed Rule-Breaking in Prison: A Look at
Disciplinary Response, 1 JUST. Q. 435, 445 (1985).
36. See id.
37. See Erick D. Poole & Robert M. Regoli, Race, Institutional Rule-Breaking, and Institutional
Response: A Study of Discretionary Decision-Making in Prison, 14 L. & Soc'Y REv. 931,942-46 (1980).
38. See id. at 944.
39. See JAMES STEPHAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISON RULE
VIOLATORS 1-2 (Dec. 1989).
40. See id.
41. The Supreme Court, in Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), held that due process requires
that inmates accused of a disciplinary violation and threatened with deprivation of significant liberty
receive: (1) notification of the charges no later than twenty-four hours before their adjudication; (2)
assistance by a staff member, inmate, or some other "counsel substitute" for illiterate defendants or for
those persons facing complex accusations; (3) production of witnesses for the accused unless their
presence would be "unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals;" and (4) an explanation
of a guilty verdict, Id. at 563-64, 592. Ninety percent of the adjudications result in convictions. See
STEPHAN, supra note 39, at 1.
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frequent sanction that adjudicators impose is solitary confinement.42 Inmates
most fear the loss of good time ' because it extends their time served." Other
sanctions include denial of entertainment/recreational activities and loss of
commissary privileges.45
2. The Reach of Prison Rules
Inmates encounter rules that constrict every fundamental right. It is ironic that
prison rules ostensibly promote good order, while placing significant limitations
on rights said to be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."'
One fundamental right - privacy47 - may well be the "the most comprehen-
sive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."48 Nonetheless, among
the initial "abasements, degradations, humiliations, and profanations of self' 9
that a new inmate (a "fish"' ) experiences is the near total loss of privacy. As
one "fish" recounted:
My escort guard ordered me to "get naked" and surrender my personal
effects to an inmate dressed in brown prison garb. I was still wearing
my nice prison suit and tie from the Courthouse. As I stripped down,
I handed the silent inmate the last vestiges of my social identity ....
After the guard conducted another "bend-over-and-stretch-'em" search,
I was given delousing shampoo and ordered to shower.5
Various prison rules continue the loss of privacy. One's appearance may be
subject to regulation.' Outgoing and incoming nonprivileged mail 3 can be read
42. See STEPHAN, supra note 39, at 6-7 (finding that adjudicators imposed segregation on 31% of
rule violators).
43. Good time is "the amount of time deducted from time to be served in prison ... contingent
upon good behavior .... " U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DICTIONARY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA TER-
MINOLOGY 98 (2d ed. 1981).
44. See iii at 6-7 (finding that adjudicators imposed loss of good time on 25% of rule violators).
45. See id (finding that adjudicators imposed denial of entertainment/recreational activities and loss
of commissary privileges on 15% and 13%, respectively, of rule violators).
46. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
47. See generally, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (ruling that the right of
privacy is fundamental).
48. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
49. GOFFMAN, supra note 12, at 14.
50. WILIAM K. BENTLEY & JAMES M. CORBETr, PRISON SLANG 26 (1992) (defining a "fish" as
"[ain inmate new to a particular prison system in any given state").
51. VICTOR HASSiNE, LIFE WrTHOUT PAROLE 8 (1996).
52. See, e.g., CAL. RULES & REGULATIONS, supra note 30, at 32-33; GEORGIA DEP'T OF CORREC-
TIONS, PRISONER HANDBOOK 44 (Mar. 1999) [hereinafter GA. PRISONER HANDBOOK]; MICH. PRISONER
GUIDEBOOK, supra note 28, at 17; MISS. INMATE HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 35; N.H. MANUAL FOR
INMATES, supra note 28, at 9; PENNSYLVANIA DEP'T OF CORRECTION, INMATE HANDBOOK 807-1 (Jan.
1997) [hereinafter PA. INMATE HANDBOOK]; S.D. INMATE GUIDE, supra note 30, at 4; TENN. RULES &
REGULATIONS, supra note 28, at 21; UTAH INMATE HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 49.
53. Privileged mail generally includes correspondence to and from attorneys, elected representatives,
and court personnel. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 57-77 (1974) (holding that attorney mail
could be opened only in the presence of its inmate-recipient and could not be read).
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and inspected for contraband," and drug testing may be mandated." Some
institutions warn inmates that they can be searched at any time and for any
reason.m
As he is escorted from intake, the "fish" quickly learns that freedom of travel,
a fundamental right entitling "all citizens.., to travel throughout the length and
breadth of our land,"' is another casualty of confinement. Walls bound the
inmate's world; movement from one destination to another is closely monitored.
Accordingly, being in an unauthorized area invariably constitutes a disciplinary
violation."
Reading the institution's inmate handbook, the "fish" observes that freedom of
speech - that guarantor of the "free trade of ideas" 9 - also falls victim to
imprisonment. Prison rules restrict the content of outgoing general mail. °
Newspapers, magazines, and books must come directly from the publisher."
Prison staff can censor them.'
In turn, imprisonment dramatically curtails freedom of association - a right
"deeply embedded" in the concept of ordered liberty.63 Visitors, including the
media, must be preapproved.( Intraprison inmate organizations, such as chapters
54. See, e.g., CAL. RULES & REGULATIONS, supra note 30, § 3130, at 54; GA. PRISONER
HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 4; Miss. INMATE HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 37; N.H. MANUAL FOR
INMATES, supra note 28, at 24; S.D. INMATE GUIDE, supra note 30, at 5; UTAH INMATE HANDBOOK,
supra note 28, at 35-36.
55. See, e.g., MICH. PRISONER GUIDEBOOK, supra note 28, at 19; MiSS. INMATE HANDBOOK, supra
note 28, at 9-12; UTAH INMATE HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 49.
56. See, e.g., S.D. INMATE GUIDE, supra note 30, at 3; UTAH INMATE HANDBOOK, supra note 28,
at 46.
57. See generally, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (ruling that the right to
travel is fundamental).
58. See, e.g., CAL. RULES & REGULATIONS, supra note 30, § 3015, at 14; GA. PRISONER
HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 27; Miss. INMATE HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 49; PA. INMATE
HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 3; TENN. RULES & REGULATIONS, supra note 28, at 9.
59. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see, e.g.,
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 544 (1980) (ruling that
the tight to free speech, including mail, is fundamental).
60. See, e.g., CAL. RULES & REGULATIONS, supra note 30, § 3138, at 55; GA. PRISONER
HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 4-5; MISs. INMATE HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 37; N.H. MANUAL FOR
INMATES, supra note 28, at 24; PA. INMATE HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 803-1; UTAH INMATE
HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 35-36. See generally Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (ruling that
restrictions on inmate correspondence that are reasonably related to correctional goals do not violate the
First Amendment).
61. See, e.g., CAL. RULES & REGULATIONS, supra note 30, § 3138, at 55; GA. PRISONER
HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 5; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548-52 (1979) (ruling that
requiring publications to come directly from their publishers is reasonably related to correctional goals
and thus does not violate the First Amendment).
62. See, e.g., GA. PRISONER HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 25; MAINE STATE PRISON, HANDBOOK
5-6 (May 1995) [hereinafter ME. PRISON HANDBOOK]; MONT. STATE PRISON, PoLicY No.: MSP 5.4.1
(Nov. 14, 1997); N.H. MANUAL FOR INMATES, supra note 28, at 24; PA. INMATE HANDBOOK, supra note
52, at 814-1; S.D. INMATE GUIDE, supra note 30, at 4.
63. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981).
64. See, e.g., CAL RULES & REGULATIONS, supra note 30, § 3170, at 60-61; ME. PRISON
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of Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous, exist at the pleasure of
prison staff.'
Lastly, prison rules curtail religious activities by regulating when, where, and
how inmates worship.' In so doing, these rules tread on a fundamental right67
that "will little bear the gentlest touch of the governmental hand.'"
I1. The Emergence of the Rational-Basis Test
Despite the intrusive nature of prison rules, courts refused to review their
constitutionality until the late 1960s. They took a hands-off approach. 9 Judges
claimed that they lacked sufficient knowledge about prison administration.0
HANDBOOK, supra note 62, at 4-5; NEB. RULES & REGULATIONS, supra note 28, at 14; N.H. MANUAL
FOR INMATE, supra note 28, at 28; PA. INMATE HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 009-3, 812-1; S.D.
INMATE GUIDE, supra note 30, at 5; TENN. RULES & REGULATIONS, supra note 28, at 25. See generally
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 126-32 (1977) (banning inmate union
activities is reasonably related to correctional goals and thus does not violate the First Amendment);
Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843, 846-50 (1974) (ruling that a prison ban on face-to-face
interviews with inmates by the media is reasonably related to correctional goals and thus does not violate
the First Amendment); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833 (1974) (ruling that the First Amendment does
not guarantee the press special access to information not available to the general public).
65. See, e.g., CAL. RULES & REGULATIONS, supra note 30, § 320, at 15; GA. PRISONER HANDBOOK,
supra note 52, at 25; PA. INMATE HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 11-12. See generally Jones, 433 U.S.
at 126-32 (banning inmate union activity is reasonably related to correctional goals and thus does not
violate the First Amendment).
66. See, e.g., N.H. MANUAL FOR INMATES, supra note 28, at 26; PA. INMATE HANDBOOK, supra
note 52, at 18; UTAH INMATE HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 45-46. See generally O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350-51 (1987) (ruling that restrictions on association that are reasonably related
to correctional goals do not violate the First Amendment).
67. See generally, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (ruling that the right to worship
is fundamental).
68. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 231 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
69. See e.g., Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504, 505-06 (10th Cir. 1969) ("We have consistently
adhered to the so-called 'hands-off policy .... ); Douglas v. Sigler, 386 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1967)
("[C]ourts will not interfere with the conduct, management, and disciplinary control of this type of
institution except in extreme cases."); Sutton v. Settle, 302 F.2d 286,288 (8th Cir. 1962) ("[Clourts have
no power to supervise the management and disciplinary rules of such institutions"); Garcia v. Steele, 193
F.2d 276, 278 (8th Cir. 1951) ("[Clourts have no supervisory jurisdiction over the conduct of the various
institutions .... ."); Powell v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 330, 331 (10th Cir. 1949) ("The prison system is under
the administration of the Attorney General ... and not of the district courts."); Sarshik v. Sanford, 142
F.2d 676, 676 (10th Cir. 1944) ("The courts have no function to superintend the treatment of prisoners
in the penitentiary, but only to deliver from prison those who are illegally detained there."); United States
ex rel. Yaris v. Shaughnessy, 112 F. Supp. 143, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) ("[Ilt is unthinkable that the
judiciary should take over the operation of... prisons."); see also ScoTr CutusTANSON, WiTH LIBERTY
FOR SOME 252 (1998) (stating that prior to the late 1960s "[A]mericans' constitutional rights effectively
stopped at the prison gate"); Eugene N. Barkin, The Emergence of Correctional Law and the Awareness
of the Rights of the Convicted, 45 NEB. L. REv. 669, 669 (1966) (observing that the constitutional status
of prisoners is "the most neglected area' of correctional law); Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners:
The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 985,986-87 (1962) ("[C]ourts have been so influenced by the
dogma of the independence of prison authorities that judicial intervention has been limited to the extreme
situation.").
70. See e.g., Garcia, 193 F.2d at 278; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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They feared that judicial review would invite frivolous litigation" as well as
weaken already tenuous staff control over inmates.' Some argued that prison
complaints addressed privileges, not rights.' Moreover, federal judges often
invoked federalism as a basis for abstaining from disputes involving state
prisoners and their keepers."
A newly admitted inmate encountered a prison that bore little relationship to
the idealistic justifications for the hands-off doctrine. Corrupted trusties
effectively ran many prisons." Rape and assault, while below today's levels,
plagued many institutions.76 Despite the rhetoric of rehabilitation, reform usually
gave way to custodial concerns.' Inmates could expect substandard medical care
at best." In Southern prisons, segregation prevailed.
STANDAIS & GOALS, CORRECTIONS 18 (1973) ("Judges felt that correctional administration was a
technical matter to be left to experts rather than to courts . . .
71. See e.g., Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 852 (9th Cir. 1951).
72. See e.g., Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548, 550-51 (4th Cir. 1963); Cullum v. California Dep't
of Corrections, 267 F. Supp. 524, 525-26 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Golub v. Krimsky, 185 F. Supp. 783, 784
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
73. See e.g., Douglas v. Sigler, 386 F.2d 684, 687 (8th Cir. 1967); Parks v. Ciccone, 281 F. Supp.
805, 809-10 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
74. See e.g., United States ex rel Lawrence v. Ragen, 323 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1963); Eaton v.
Bibb, 217 F.2d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 1954).
75. See e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 374-75 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th
Cir. 1971). In Holt, the court stated:
A trusty is not expected to take any steps to protect an inmate from violence at the hands
of another inmate, and trusties do not do so .... They can and do sell favors, easy jobs,
and coveted positions; they can and do extort money from inmates on any and all pretexts.
They operate rackets within the prison, involving among other things the forcing of
inmates to buy from them things like coffee at exorbitant prices.
Id.; see also Charles B. Fields, Trusties, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS 461, 462 (Marilyn
D. McShane & Frank P. Williams III eds., 1997) (stating that trusties were a common feature of Southern
prisons at one time and arose from a "castelike social structure" found in the region and a rewards system
designed to secure inmate cooperation).
76. See, e.g., Alan J. Davis, Sexual Assaults in the Philadelphia Prison System and Sherifs Vans,
6 TRANS-ACrION 8, 9 (1968) (observing that in Phladelphia's jails "virtually every slightly-built young
man committed by the courts is sexually approached within a day or two after his admission to prison").
77. See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 86 (1971) (observing that
prison staff embraced rehabilitation as a means of gaining greater control over inmates); JESSICA
MrrFORD, KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT 106 (1973) (observing that "in many states there is not even
the pretense of making 'therapy' available to the adult offender").
78. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1300 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding an absence of "prompt
and efficient" medical care in Mississippi prisons); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278, 281 (M.D.
Ala. 1972) (finding that the one hospital for Alabama's inmates employed no full-time physicians);
BRADLEY STEWART CHILTON, PRISONS UNDER THE GAVEL 42 (1991) (stating that medical facilities at
the Georgia State Prison were "wholly inadequate and understaffed"); LARRY W. YACKLE, REFORM AND
REGRET 30-39 (1989) (summarizing expert testimony about Alabama's understaffed and outdated medical
facilities for inmates).
79. See DAVID M. OSHINSKY, "WORSE THAN SLAVERY" 162 (1996) (describing racial segregation
in Mississippi's Parchman prison); WELCH, supra note 23, at 369 box 13-2 (1996) (observing that until
the 1960s institutional racism prevailed in prison; that segregation by race was a feature of imprisonment;
and that living conditions for whites were better than those of blacks); see also JOHN IRWIN, PRISONS
[Vol. 53:161
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A. The Demise of the Hands-off Doctrine
The Supreme Court's 1961 decision in Monroe v. Pape"0 laid the foundation for
a new, bureaucratic prison. The Monroe Court held that section 1983 of the recodified
Civil Rights Act of 18718! remedied civil rights violations committed by government
agents.' Three years later, in Cooper v. Pate,' the Supreme Court refused to block
an inmate's civil rights actionm In 1966, the first year in which a tally was kept,
federal courts entertained 218 prison-related lawsuits brought under section 1983.
By 1971, inmate-plaintiffs initiated 2915 section 1983 actions.' Thereafter, that
number grew exponentially and exceeded 39,000 by 1996."
Much earlier, in 1838 in Barron v. Baltimore the Court had held that the Bill of
Rights applied only to the federal government and thus placed no constraints on state
prisons.' Later, in the Slaughter-House Casesm the Court ruled that the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment left this bifurcated arrangement
in tact.9' State inmates would have to await the Warren Court for effective remedy
of their federal civil rights.
Over the course of two decades, the Warren Court made the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment a repository for individual rights that transcended state
borders and city police stations. By the late 1960s, the Fourteenth Amendment
IN TURMOIL 9 (1980) (observing that blacks and whites resided in separate sections of the "Big House"
prison-type).
80. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
81. The Act's current codification is 42 U.S.C § 1983 (Supp. IV 1998). It reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, immunities, or privileges secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action in law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceedings for redress .... For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of
the District of Columbia.
Id.
82. Section 1983 was originally codified in the Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191.
83. 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam).
84. See id. at 546.
85. See JIM THOMAS, PRISONER LGATION 58 tbl. 3c (1988).
86. See id.
87. See BUREAU oF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICs -1997,
at 442 tbl. 5.80 (1998) [hereinafter SOURCEoOK].
88. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833).
89. See id. at 247.
90. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
91. See id. at 74. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating in relevant part that "[n]o
[s]tate shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States"); Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L.
REv. 1323 (1952) (discussing the Act's early history).
92. See, e.g., FRED P. GRAHAM, THE DUE PROCESs REVOLUTION (1970) (describing the Court's
2000)
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reached into the nation's prisons. In Mempa v. Rhay,' the Court held that
revocation of probation implicated one's liberty interest under the Due Process Clause
and therefore must be preceded by procedural safeguards? In a brief per curium
opinion in Lee v. Washington, the Court struck down de jure racial segregation of
inmates.' Lastly, in Johnson v. Avery, ' the Justices ruled that inmates' right of
access to the courts included consultation with 'jailhouse lawyers."
Lower federal courts soon took the lead in bringing inmates into the constitutional
mainstream." Their decisions ranged over virtually every aspect of an inmate's life,
including: classification;... discipline;' inmate-on-inmate violence;' racial
discrimination;" medical care;' 0 access to the courts;' religious freedom; °
piecemeal extension of the Bill of Rights to the criminal justice systems of the states).
93. Earlier, the Court had federalized the civil rights of criminal suspects. See, e.g., Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969) (ruling that the Fifth Amendment right against double jeopardy
applies to the states); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160-62 (1968) (ruling that the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury applies to the states); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965)
(ruling that the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation applies to the states); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1, 3 (1964) (ruling that the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination applies to the
states); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963) (ruling that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel applies to the states).
94. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
95. See id. at 133-37.
96. 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiai).
97. See id, at 333-34.
98. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
99. A jailhouse lawyer is an "[i]nmate of a penal institution who spends his time reading the law
and giving legal assistance and advice to inmates, especially to those who are illiterate." BLACK'S LAW
DICIONARY 834 (6th ed. 1990).
100. See Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil Rights Cases and the Provision of
Counsel, 17 So. ILL L. REV. 417,425 (1993) ("Unlike the revolution in criminal procedure that resulted
from a series of Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s, the most important prisoner rights cases were
decided by lower federal courts.") (footnote omitted). Several commentators explored the early
involvement of the lower federal courts. See, e.g., Fred Cohen, The Discovery of Prison Reform, 21
BUFF. L. REV. 855 (1972); Daryl R. Fair, The Lower Federal Courts as Constitution-Makers: The Case
of Prison Conditions, 7 AM. J. CRIM. L. 119 (1979); Malcolm M. Feeley & Roger A. Hanson, The
Impact of Intervention on Prisons and Jails: A Framework for Analysis and Review of the Literature,
in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSiTrUTION 12 (John D. Dilulio, Jr. ed., 1990); Harvard Ctr. for
Criminal Justice, Judicial Intervention in Prison Discipline, 63 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
200 (1972); Richard G. Singer, Prisoners' Rights Litigation: A Look at the Past Decade and a Look at
the Coming Decade, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1980, at 3; Scott D. Anderson et aL, Note, A Review of
Prisoners' Rights Litigation Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 11 U. RICH. L. REV. 803 (1977); Michael S.
Feldberg, Comment, Confronting Conditions of Confinement: An Expanded Role for the Courts in Prison
Reform, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 367 (1977); Note, Decency and Fairness: An Emerging Judicial
Role in Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. REV. 841 (1971).
101. See, e.g., Kelly v. Brewer, 525 F.2d 394, 400-02 (8th Cir. 1975).
102. See, e.g., Knell v. Bensinger, 489 F.2d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 1973).
103. See, e.g., Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973).
104. See, e.g., Thomas v. Brierley, 481 F.2d 660, 661 (3d Cir. 1973).
105. See, e.g., Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072, 1076 (6th Cir. 1972).
106. See, e.g., Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251, 253 (2d Cir. 1972).
107. See, e.g., Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, 28-29 (5th Cir. 1969).
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solitary confinement; 9  fire hazards; 9  overcrowding; 10  exercise;.' prison
rules;"' treatment of pretrial detainees; speech;" search and seizure;" food,
shelter, clothing, and sanitation;"' and totality of living conditions."7
In several instances, lower federal courts assumed control of entire state prisons
systems."' As Professors Feeley and Hanson observed, "The extent of this invol-
vement by the federal judiciary in overseeing major changes [in] the nation's jails and
prisons is perhaps second in breadth and detail only to the courts' earlier role in
dismantling segregation in the nation's public schools.""9
B. From Wolff v. McDonnell to Bell v. Wolfish
For the prisoners' rights movement, the high water mark came in Wolff v.
McDonnell." "[There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the
prisons of this country," declared the Wolff Court in 1974.2 The Court spoke of a
policy of "mutual accommodation" between inmate rights and penal objectives."
108. See, e.g., Wright v. McMann. 387 F.2d 519, 526-27 (2d Cir. 1967).
109. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Covington, 445 F. Supp. 195, 202 (W.D. Ark. 1978).
110. See, e.g., Padgett v. Stein, 406 F. Supp. 287, 299 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
111. See, e.g. Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F. Supp. 1123, 1128-29 (E.D. La. 1971).
112. See, e.g., Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257, 272-73 (D. Md. 1972).
113. See, e.g., Conklin v. Hancock, 334 F. Supp. 1119, 1121-24 (D.N.H. 1971).
114. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 204 (2d Cir. 1971).
115. See, e.g., Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1975).
116. See, e.g., Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 286 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part sub nom.
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
117. See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.
1971).
118. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1297-302 (S.D. Tex. 1980), modified, 650 F.2d
555 (5th Cir. 1981), afd in part and rev'd in part, 666 F.2d 854 (5th Cir.), modified, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th
Cir. 1982) (ordering system-wide relief in Texas); Newman, 559 F.2d at 289-90 (ordering system-wide
relief in Alabama); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956,986-89 (D.R.I. 1977), remanded, 599 F.2d
17 (1st Cir.), affd, 616 F.2d 598 (Ist Cir. 1979) (ordering system-wide relief in Rhode Island); Holt, 309
F. Supp. at 382-85 (ordering system-wide relief in Arkansas). See also BRADLEY STEWART CHILTON,
PRISONS UNDER THE GAvEL (1991) (examining judicial intervention in Georgia Prisons); BEN M.
CROUCH & JAMES W. MARQUART, AN APPEAL TO JUSTICE: LrGATED REFORM OF TEXAS PRISONS
(1989) (examining judicial intervention in Texas prisons); M. KAY HARRIS & DUDLEY P. SPILLER, JR.,
AFrER DEcISON: IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL DECREES IN CORRECTIONAL SETINGS (1977)
(examining judicial intervention in several jurisdictions); YACKLE, supra note 78 (examining judicial
intervention in Alabama prisons); Sheldon Ekland-Olson & Steve J. Martin, Ruiz: A Struggle over
Legitimacy, in COURTS, CORREMONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 73 (John D. Dilulio, Jr. ed., 1990)
(examining intervention in Texas); Dennis C. Sullivan & Larry L. Tifft, Intervention in Correction, 21
CRIME & DELINQ. 213 (1975) (identifying implementation problems nationwide); Judicial Intervention
in Corrections: The California Experience - An Empirical Study, 20 UCLA L. REV. 452 (1973)
(examining judicial intervention in California prisons).
119. Feeley & Hanson, supra note 100, at 13.
120. 418 U.S. 539 (1974); see JAMES B. JACOBS, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PRISONS AND IMPRISON-
mENr 42 (1983) [hereinafter JACOBS, NEW PERsPECtnVES] (commenting that the Court's ruling in Wolff
"provided the kind of clarion statement that could serve as a rallying call for prisoners' rights advocates").
121. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555-56.
122. It. at 556.
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Accordingly, the Court in Wolffheld that inmates could contact their attorneys without
censorship"3 and must receive procedural safeguards when threatened with punish-
ment for prison rule violations.lu
As illustrated by the First Amendment cases, the Court's subsequent decisions
during the 1970s fell short of mutual accommodation. The first case to be decided,
Procunier v. Martinez," refused to answer whether inmates enjoyed First
Amendmente' safeguards and instead held that free speech rights of outside
correspondents merited protection." The majority opinion invoked a deferential
approach to inmate complaints similar to the hands-off doctrine:
Suffice it to say that the problems of prisons in America are complex and
intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of
resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and
the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the
province of the legislative and executive branches of government. For all
of those reasons, courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly
urgent problems of prison administration and reform. . . .Moreover,
where state penal institutions are involved, federal courts have a further
reason for deference to the appropriate prison authorities."
The companion cases of Pell v. Procunier and Saxbe v. Washington Post"
addressed the media's asserted right to face-to-face access to particular inmates. Once
again, the Court prefaced its decision on deference: "Such considerations [about
visitation] are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections
officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the
officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should
ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.''. The Court upheld the
ban as a reasonable security measure." Speaking for the dissenters, Justice Powell
discounted the Court's security concerns and argued that face-to-face interviews with
designated inmates were crucial for accurate reporting.'33
In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc.,"3 the Justices reviewed
prison regulations that permitted inmates to join unions but banned various union
activities, such as rank-and-file meetings.3 Speaking for the majority, Justice
123. See id. at 574-77.
124. See id. at 563.
125. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
126. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (reading in relevant part that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press").
127. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 409.
128. IM at 404-05.
129. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
130. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
131. Pell, 417 U.S. at 827.
132. See idi at 823, 833.
133. Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 853-54, 866-69 (Powell, J., dissenting).
134. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
135. See id at 126.
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Rehnquist evoked a policy of "wide-ranging deference to ... the decisions of prison
administrators.""' Unlike the Court's earlier rulings, Justice Rehnquist made it clear
that the burden of proof lay not with the state, but with the plaintiffs; moreover,
prison officials' speculative security concerns must be "conclusively shown to be
wrong . . .. " He found that the plaintiffs had failed in this regard.' Justice
Marshall's dissent accused the Court of taking "a giant step backwards" toward the
hands-off doctrine.'3
In the last major case of the 1970s, Bell v. Wolfish," the Court reversed the
rulings of the district and circuit courts, which had found unconstitutional various
restraints imposed on pretrial detainees. Bell resurrected a portion of the "iron curtain"
that the Wolff Court had purportedly brought down.' Bell posited that institutional
restrictions would pass constitutional muster as long as they "are reasonably related
to the government's interest in maintaining security and order and operating the
institution in a manageable fashion."'4 Furthermore, this test of reasonableness
required courts to defer to prison staff:
[C]ourts must heed our warning that "[s]uch considerations are peculiarly
within the province and professional expertise of correctional officials, and
in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that
officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts
should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters."'43
While Pell and Jones foretold the Court's decision in Bell, it nonetheless marked
a turning point. After Bell, the Court revisited several issues - First Amendment
concerns,"' cruel and unusual punishment," and due process" - and, in each
136. Id
137. Id at 132.
138. See id. at 132-33.
139. Id at 139 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
140. 441 U.S. 520, 562-63 (1979).
141. Volff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,555-56 (1974) ("MIhere is no iron curtain drawn between
the Constitution and the prisons of this country.").
142. Bell, 441 U.S. at 540 n.23.
143. Id. at 547-48 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
144. Compare Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,419 (1989) (ruling that institutional regulations
restricting the exercise of association should be upheld if they are reasonably related to institutional
goals), and O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350-51 (1987) (ruling that institutional
regulations restricting the exercise of speech should be upheld if they are reasonably related to
institutional goals), and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91 (1987) (ruling that institutional regulations
restricting the exercise of religion should be upheld if they are reasonably related to institutional goals),
with Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-14 (1974) (ruling that institutional regulations restricting
correspondence with persons outside prison must advance important and substantial governmental
interests in the least restrictive manner).
145. Compare Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-44 (1994) (ruling that prison conditions inflict
cruel and unusual punishment when (1) defendants evidence deliberate indifference, that is, actual
knowledge of a high risk of injury; and (2) fail to respond in a reasonable manner in light of that risk),
with Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (ruling that prison conditions, when considered in
their totality, must be intolerable if they are to inflict cruel and usual punishment; and implying that the
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instance, rolled back inmates' rights." Therefore, some commentators have argued
that the Court after Bell re-embraced the hands-off doctrine." Others have more
properly called the post-Bell era the "one-hand-on and one-hand-off' in that the Court
will articulate standards of review, but in their formulation and operationalization the
Court will define them in such a way as to place all but the most abusive practices
outside judicial remedies."
C. Turner v. Safley and the Bifurcation of Rights
In the eight years that separated Bell v. Wolfish from Turner v. Safley, the prison
population rapidly expanded,"5 the states repudiated the "rehabilitative ideal,"'53 and
defendant's state of mind is not relevant for Eighth Amendment purposes).
146. Compare Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995) (ruling that state-created liberty
interests are deprived by atypical, significant hardships) with Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-72
(1983) (ruling that state-created liberty interests are deprived when prison officials engage in actions that
are regulated by state law via substantive predicates and other mandatory language).
147. In its post-Bell rulings, the Court continued to emphasize that security concerns greatly curtail
inmates' retained rights and that considerable deference should be accorded prison staff in this regard.
See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (embracing a deferential attitude toward the actions
of prison staff because "such a standard is necessary if 'prison administrators .... and not the courts,
[are] to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations") (citation omitted) (quoting
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977)); Block v. Rutherford,
468 U.S. 576, 589 (1984) (chastising the trial court for substituting its notions of proper jail
administration for that of "experienced administrators").
148. See, e.g., Mark Berger, Withdrawal of Rights and Due Deference: The New Hands-Off Policy
in Correctional Litigation, 47 UMKC L. REv. 1, 5 (1978); Emily Calhoun, The Supreme Court and the
Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: A Reappraisal, 4 HASTINGS CONsr. L.Q. 219, 220 (1977); Cheryl
Dunn Giles, Turner v. Safley and Its Progeny: A Gradual Retreat to the "Hands-Off' Doctrine?, 35
ARm. L. REv. 219, 229-30 (1993).
149. See WI.LIAM C. COLLINS, CORRECTIONAL LAW FOR THE CORRECTIONAL OFFICER 11 (1990)
(using the "one-hand-on, one-hand-off" phrase as a chapter subtitle); MARGARET FISHER ET AL.,
PRACTICAL LAW FOR JAIL AND PRISON PERSONNEL 17 (2d ed. 1987) ("Dubbed by some the 'one-hand-
on, one-hand-off' approach, it encouraged federal judges to identify the existence of constitutional rights'
[sic] violations but to defer to thp expertise of jail and prison officials in the administration of the
institution."). Others have characterized the Court's approach as one of deference to prison administrators.
See, e.g., TODD R. CLEAR & GEORGE F. COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 404 (4th ed. 1997) (asserting
that "[a] return to a strict hands-off policy seems highly unlikely, but greater deference is being given
to prison administrators"); PEAK, supra note 9. at 219 ("This [due deference] doctrine has not been
developed sufficiently, however, to determine when the courts should or should not intervene.
Frequently, the result has been, as in Bell, that courts accept jurisdiction over prisoners' claims but fail
to provide a remedy to them.") (footnote omitted). Professors Krantz and Branham stated that "[t]he
reasons given for this deference are many of the same reasons which underlay the 'hands-off doctrine' -
separation of powers, federalism, judges' lack of expertise in correctional matters, and a concern that
judicial intervention will undermine institutional security and the purposes of incarceration." SHELDON
KRANTZ & LYNN S. BRANHAM, THE LAW OF SENTENCING, CORRECTIONS, AND PRISONERS' RiaHTs 140-
42 (5th ed. 1998).
150. See SOURCEnOOK, supra note 87, at 490 tbi.6.35 (301,470 sentenced federal and state inmates
in 1979 versus 560,812 in 1987).
151. Francis A. Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POuICE SCI. 226, 226-27 (1959). Allen stated:
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the Court decided a host of prison cases."m One addressed the constitutionality of
institutional rules. In Block v. Rutherford, 3 the Court reviewed regulations that
barred contact visits for detainees, including those classified as low risk."s In
applying the rational-basis test, the Court quoted at length the Bell Court's call for
deference to the judgments of prison staff' and proceeded to chastise the trial court
for substituting its notions of proper jail administration for that of "experienced
administrators."'" Four Justices vigorously took issue with the Court's deployment
The rehabilitative ideal is itself a complex of ideas.... It is assumed, first, that human
behavior is the product of antecedent causes. These causes can be identified as part of the
physical universe, and it is the obligation of the scientist to discover and describe them
with all possible exactitude. Knowledge of the antecedents of human behavior makes
possible an approach to the scientific control of human behavior. Finally ... it is
assumed that measures employed to treat the convicted offender should serve a therapeutic
function, that such measures should be designed to effect changes in the behavior of the
convicted person in the interests of his own happiness, health, and satisfactions and in the
interest of social defense.
Id. The ascendancy of the just deserts model accompanied the decline of the rehabilitative ideal. Critics
argued that rehabilitative programs had failed to reduce the recidivism rate among inmates. See, e.g.,
Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 42 PUBLIC INTEREsT 22,
25 (1974). Rehabilitation also lost support because of various social changes occurring in the 1960s and
1970s - rising crime rates, and greater numbers of nonwhite inmates. See FRANcEs A. ALLEN, THE
DECLINE OF THE REHABILiTATwIE IDE.AL 29-31 (1981).
152. Aside from Block v. Rutherford, see infra notes 153-58 and accompanying text, the Court
decided five major conditions of confinement cases. In the most important, Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337 (1981), the Court ruled that double-ceiling of inmates did not in itself impose cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See id at 348. Here too the Court urged deference:
"This Court must proceed cautiously; courts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials are
insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing sociological problems of how best
to achieve the goals of the penal function in the criminal justice system .... " Id. at 351-52. Turning
to the issue of due process, the Court in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), ruled that prison
regulations controlling the use of administrative segregation could give rise to protected liberty interests
and accompanying procedural safeguards. See id at 470-72. Later, in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517
(1984), the Court held that inmates possessed no Fourth Amendment protection in cell searches because
they lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in a prison cell. See id at 529-30. The following year,
in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985), the Court again demonstrated its commitment to minimal
judicial review by ruling that the evidentiary standard for disciplinary verdicts on appeal is merely "a
modicum of evidence." Id. at 455. Finally, in Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986), the Court
effectively deferred to prison staff in ruling that the use of force to quell a riot is constitutionally
acceptable if they acted in "good faith." Id. at 320.
153. 468 U.S. 576 (1984).
154. See id. at 588. A contact visit is one in which inmate and visitor are permitted some physical
contact, such as a kiss or embrace. See id. at 579.
155. See id. at 585 ("[Prison] administrators (are to be] accorded wide-ranging deference in the
adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal
order and discipline and to maintain institutional security." (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547
(1979))).
156. Id. at 589 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 554).
The court's further "balancing" resulted in an impermissible substitution of its view on the
proper administration of Central Jail for that of the experienced administrators of that
facility. Here, as in Wolfish, "[it] is plain from [the] opinions that the lower courts simply
disagreed with the judgment of [the jail] officials about the extent of the security interests
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of due deference. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion warned that "careless
invocation of 'deference' would bring a return to the hands-off doctrine." Justice
Marshall's dissent spoke of the Court's "unwarranted confidence in the good faith and
'expertise' of prison administrators" and its willingness "to sanction any prison
condition for which they can image a colorable rationale, no matter how oppressive
or ill-justified that condition is in fact.""
In its landmark ruling in Turner v. Safley,' the Court reviewed the
constitutionality of two regulations of the Missouri Division of Corrections. The first
had the practical effect of prohibiting correspondence between unrelated inmates."w
The second barred female inmates from marrying without the permission of the
warden. 6' After examining several of the Court's prior prison cases, Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion declared that "when a prison regulation impinges on
inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests.'"" Justice O'Connor concluded that the correspon-
dence rules passed this test but not those restricting marriage."
The Turner Court cobbled together several factors for determining the
reasonableness of a prison regulation. First, the regulation cannot be arbitrary or
irrational in that one must find "a 'valid, rational connection' between the prison
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it."'" The
second factor "is whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that
remains open to prison inmates."" Even if an alternative exists, judges "should be
particularly conscious of the . . . 'deference owed to corrections officials . . . in
gauging the validity of the regulation.""'  Thirdly, courts should consider the likely
impact that accommodating the asserted right will have on staff, inmates, and the
allocation of resources." The final inquiry addresses whether the challenged
regulation represents "an exaggerated response," which is gauged by the availability
of "obvious, easy" alternatives to the regulation in question that would allow both the
institution to achieve its objectives and the inmate to exercise the asserted right."u
The Court's subsequent applications of the Turner rational-basis test upheld prison
regulations restraining religious practices,'" prohibiting the receipt of publications
affected and the means required to further those interests."
Id.
157. Id. at 593 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 596 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
159. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
160. See id. at 82.
161. See id. at 82-83.
162. ld. at 89.
163. See id at 94-99.
164. Id. at 89 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
165. See id. at 90.
166. Id. (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)) (emphasis added).
167. See id.
168. Id. at 90.
169. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987).
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inconsistent with "good order,"'" and authorizing the forced administration of
antipsychotic drugs to a mentally competent inmate." These rulings rejected calls
for a more rigorous standard when prison regulations "effectively prohibit rather than
simply limit" exercise of a right; n implicate "fundamental" rather than nonfun-
damental rights; " or regulate activities that are not "presumptively dangerous."74
IV. Deconstructing the Rational-Basis Test
Footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products" outlined the Court's
special role as guardian of fundamental rights and "discrete and insular
minorities.""l7h It posited that the normal presumption of constitutionality would no
longer be present when government action (1) interfered with the normal operation
of democratic process; (2) discriminated against discrete and insular groups; or (3)
threatened individual rights." Regarding the latter, footnote four stated:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth [Amendment]."'
Since Carolene Products, the Court has decreed that classifications burdening
fundamental rights - excepting those of prisoners - trigger strict scrutiny."7 To
satisfy strict scrutiny, the government must demonstrate that the impediment
advances a compelling state interest"5 in a narrowly tailored manner."' The
rational-basis test, on the other hand, presumes the constitutionality of government
170. Thomburg v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407-14 (1989).
171. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 219-27 (1990).
172. OLone, 482 U.S. at 349 n.2.
173. Id. at 349.
174. Id. at 349 n.2.
175. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
176. Id at 152-53 n.4; see also BRucE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 369 (1998) (observing that
footnote 4 sought to "filln the gap" created by the Court's repudiation of a constitutional system
grounded on "state's rights, property and contract").
177. See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4; see also Pamela S. Karlan, Discriminatory
Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE LJ. 111, 115 n.25 (1983)
(observing that "footnote four first suggested that the normal presumption of constitutionality may not
operate in cases involving certain distinctions").
178. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4.
179. See supra note 8 (listing cases).
180. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,463 (1958) (using the phrase "compelling interest" for
the first time).
181. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (noting that when alienage is used
as the basis for restricting welfare benefits equal protection of the law is violated); Kramer v. Union Free
Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969) (barring a class of voters from school board elections denied
equal protection of the law); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (prohibiting new state
residents from receiving welfare denies them equal protection of the law).
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action" and requires the advancement of a legitimate government interest.'
Plaintiffs rarely overcome this presumption.'"
Why, then, are inmates exempted from strict scrutiny when imprisonment
threatens their fundamental rights? This part of the Article argues that the Supreme
Court has cast prison worker and inmate in reified terms that devalues inmates'
rights.
A. The Prison Worker as Humane Bureaucrat
The Supreme Court has attached great significance to the rise of the bureaucratic
prison. According to the Court, correctional staff invariably exercise "considered"
judgment" and their backgrounds ensure that they are "trained" in prison
administration." Implicit in these characterizations is the assertion that we can
suspend the Constitution's distrust of governmental power when the conduct of
prison workers is at issue.
As we have seen, the contemporary prison has indeed experienced significant
bureaucratization.' However, these developments should not be equated with
humane confinement:
[W]hen contemporary researchers attempt to relate prison management
practices to the quality of life behind bars, the results are generally quite
negative: Prisons that are managed in a tight, authoritarian fashion are
plagued with disorder and inadequate programs, and those that are
182. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307,314 (1993) ("On rational-basis review,
a classification in a statute ... comes to us bearing a strong presumption of validity.") (citation omitted);
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) ("[LQegislation is presumed to be
valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest."); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425-26 (1961) ("State legislatures are presumed
to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some
inequity."); ef Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (challenging the constitutionality of a statute
requires negation of "every conceivable basis which might support" it) (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake
Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)).
183. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (finding no rational basis for a state
constitutional amendment that forbid legislation prohibiting discrimination against homosexuals); Hooper
v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 618 (1985) (finding no rational basis for a state law
providing tax benefits exclusively to Vietnam veterans).
184. In 1972, Professor Gerald Gunther asserted that strict scrutiny in some situations is "strict' in
theory and fatal in fact." Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1,
8 (1972). Nearly a quarter of a century later, the Court issued its retort: "[W]e wish to dispel the notion
that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.'" Adarand Contractors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
237 (1995) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)).
Nonetheless, the Court rarely finds in favor of legislation subjected to strict scrutiny. See, e.g.,
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (upholding the relocation of Japanese-Americans
during World War I1).
185. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987).
186. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979).
187. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (discussing the bureaucratization of Stateville
and other prisons).
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managed in a loose, participative fashion are equally troubled; these that
are a mixture of these two styles are not any better.'"
As illustrated by the trial court's findings in Madrid v. Gomez," prisons remain
predisposed to coercion and brutality." ° The court found that staff at California's
super-max prison at Peligan Bay had repeatedly used excessive, unnecessary, and
at times gratuitous force against certain inmates. 1 One troublesome mentally ill
inmate received severe burns when bathed in scalding waters in the prison's
hospital." An officer remarked that this African-American inmate would look like
"a white boy before this is through."'" Staff on a routine basis employed taser and
gas guns, both capable of inflicting severe pain and injury, on unarmed inmates in
cell extractions." Staff also placed naked inmates into outdoor holding cages the
size of telephone booths, some of which could be seen from the main administrative
offices.'
Although the California Administrative Code devoted dozens of pages of
regulations to the operation of its prisons," the court found written policies on the
use of force "often lacked the necessary clarity and consistency to provide
meaningful guidance."'" "It is also clear," wrote the court, "that the absence of
authoritative written guidelines allows policy to shift according to the predilections
of individual mid-level staff."'98
Indeed, daily life for many inmates in the bureaucratic prison is sometimes worse
than they experienced under the authoritarian prison. A noted criminologist
observed:
If I had to do time and could choose which [penal era] ... to do it in,
I certainly would not select the contemporary prison. In all prison
settings guards are supposed to function as police officers, among other
188. PEAK, supra note 9, at 234.
189. 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
190. See, e.g., Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding that a staff member had
used a stun gun on an inmate who refused to clean his cell); Weeks v. Chaboudy, 984 F.2d 185, 187 (6th
Cir. 1993) (finding that staff had denied a paraplegic inmate the use of a wheel chair); McCord v.
Maggio, 927 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that staff had confined an inmate to a vermin
infested, unlit cell for two years); Fruit v. Norris, 905 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that staff
had forced inmates to work in the prison's sewers without protective clothing); Women Prisoners v.
District of Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634, 639-40 (D.D.C. 1994) (finding that staff sexually assaulted
female inmates); LeMaire v. Maass, 745 F. Supp. 623, 645 (D. Or. 1990) (finding that staff had denied
outdoor recreation to an inmate for a five year period); see also infra notes 233-34 and accompanying
text (positing several factors that breed inhumane treatment of inmates).
191. See Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1159-68.
192. See id. at 1166-67.
193. Id. at 1167.
194. See id. at 1172-76.
195. See id. at 1171.
196. See CALIFORNIA DEP'r OF CORRECTIONS, RULES & REGULATIONS OF THE DIRECTOR OF
CORRECnONS (July 31, 1997).
197. Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1882.
198. Id.
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things. But in contemporary institutions, they have withdrawn to the
walls, leaving inmates to intimidate, rape, maim, and kill each other
with alarming frequency.1"
In this tense, violence-laden environment, guards find that "going by the book"
often is ineffective. Inmates do not acknowledge the legitimacy of prison rules.2"
Moreover, "the punishments which the officials can inflict.., do not represent a
profound difference from the prisoner's usual status."" In response, staff often
pursue two courses of action. The first is to make unofficial accommodations for
inmates. In exchange for inmate cooperation, guards will lessen the hardships of
confinement. 2 The second course of action involves illegal intimidation and
application of force, regardless of court rulings to the contrary. While the degree
of unauthorized violence is hard to gauge, it can reach significant levels. One study
found it "highly structured and deeply entrenched in the guard subculture."'
Another study, upon interviewing guards, reported that a majority had either
engaged in or observed illegal beatings.'
B. Judicial Scrutiny Threatens Penal Order
The Supreme Court has argued that it must defer to prison officials because
maintaining order in prison is "at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking" that
cannot readily tolerate judicial intervention.' Not surprisingly, the Court sees
inmates as "antisocial ... and often violent."' Controlling them is fraught with
"[h]erculean obstacles."' Courts,* furthermore, are 'ill equipped" to deal with
them.'2
Even if one concedes that controlling inmates is as challenging as the Court
claims, it does not necessarily follow that judicial intervention weakens the staffs
already tenuous authority. As Feeley and Hanson observed: "Ongoing studies...
on the impact of jail and prison conditions orders report that interviews with
199. Donald R. Cressey, Foreword to JOHN IRWIN, PRISONS IN TURMOIL vii-viii (1980) (emphasis
added).
200. See GESHAi M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVEs 48 (1958) (describing "the lack of an
inner moral compulsion to obey on the part of inmates").
201. Id. at 50.
202. See Richard A. Cloward, Social Control in the Prison, in THEORETICAL STUDIES IN THE
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PRISON 20, 35-41 (Richard A. Cloward et al. eds., 1960) (identifying
three informal patterns of social accommodation: over goods and services, information, and status).
203. James W. Marquart, Prison Guards and the Use of Physical Coercion as a Mechanism of
Prisoner Control, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 347, 347 (1986).
204. See KELSEY KAUFFMAN, PRISON OFFICERS AND THEIR WORLD 130 (1988).
205. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974); see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527
(1984) (quoting Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983) (quoting Wolff, 418
U.S. at 566).
206. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526.
207. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,428 (1989).
208. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974).
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defendant officials, attorneys, and guards reveal no widespread belief that court
decrees have exacerbated continuing problems of inmate violence."'
Judicial intervention on balance has been beneficial. While judicial intervention
may have diminished staff authority,"' the nexus between court-ordered reforms
and inmate violence appears weak 1  On the other hand, the benefits of judicial
intervention have been several and significant, including the abolition of horrific
conditions of confinement z as well as increased funding of correctional
institutions13 and enhanced professionalism among prison staff. 4 Even the
conservative criminologist John DiIulio, Jr. rates judicial intervention a "qualified
success":
For proponents of judicial restraint, there is no use denying that in most
cases levels of order, amenity, and service in prisons and jails have
improved as a result of judicial intervention. And in most cases it is
equally futile to assert that such improvements would have been made,
or made as quickly, in the absence of judicial intervention. 5
209. Feeley & Hanson, supra note 100, at 25.
210. See Kathleen Engel & Stanley Rothman, The Paradox of Prison Reform: Rehabilitation,
Prisoners' Rights, and Violence, 7 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 413, 430-33 (1984) (arguing that judicial
intervention has weakened staff via fear of lawsuits, procedural rights accorded inmates, diminished
legitimacy in the eyes of inmates, and charges of racism).
211. See Feeley & Hanson, supra note 100, at 18-19 (faulting Engel and Rothnan's case studies and
hypothesizing that various social changes, not judicial intervention, led to increased inmate violence).
212. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579-80 (8th Cir. 1968) (banning the whipping of
inmates); Feliciano v. Barcelo, 497 F. Supp. 14, 18-32 (D.P.R. 1979) (ordering an end to "cruel and
brutalizing conditions and treatment" endured by inmates and detainees); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F.
Supp. 956, 979, 986-90 (D.R.I. 1977) (ordering the end to conditions "unfit for human habitation"),
remanded, 599 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1979), affd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1980); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp.
881, 902 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (requiring the classification of inmates so as to protect inmates from
assaultive inmates); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 374-75 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (banning the use of
trusties having supervisory powers), affda 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Hamilton v. Shiro, 338 F. Supp.
1016, 1019 (E.D. La. 1970) (requiring the remedy of conditions that "shock the conscience as a matter
of elementary decency"); Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (banning racial
segregation in prison), affd 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam); see also CLEAR & COLE, supra note 149,
at 410 (concluding that judicial intervention has "diminished" the "more brutalizing features" of prison
life).
213. See Feeley & Hanson, supra note 100, at 30-32 (observing that Southern prisons foremostly
benefitted from increased funding born of judicial intervention).
214. See JACOBS, NEW PERSPECTiVES, supra note 120, at 54-55 (1983) (concluding that court orders
resulted in a "new administrative elite, which is better educated and more bureaucratically minded");
Feeley & Hanson, supra note 100, at 27 (observing that judicial intervention spurred professionalism
among correctional staff).
215. John J. Dilulio, Jr., Conclusion: What Judges Can Do to Improve Prisons and Jails, in
COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONsTTUTON, 287, 291 (John J. Dilulio, Jr. ed., 1990); see also LEO
CARROLL, LAWFUL ORDER 8 (1998) (observing that "overall intervention has been a qualified success");
Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 639,705-06 n.316
(1993) (finding that judicial intervention has remedied various abuses). As Jacobs observed, defining
"success" is not so simple:
Prison and mental health bureaucracies are large and complicated. They are frequently
racked by conflicting goals and competing staff factions. Needless to say, prisons rarely
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Indeed, one can question whether prisons can be governed humanely in the
absence of judicial intervention. The history of the prison, dating back to the
founding of the Walnut Street Jail in 1789, has been one of deterioration,
overcrowding, and neglect.2 6 The contemporary prison has not escaped the
historic malignancy that eventually consumes even the best intentions of prison
staff:
It would be an error to assume that most of these late-twentieth-century
mutations of the prison tend toward leniency and comfort. The most
common prisons are the overcrowded prisons proximate to the big cities
of America; they have become places of deadening routine punctuated
by bursts of fear and violence."'
Courts throughout the 1990s encountered flagrant abuses of inmates." ' These
included: cross-gender strip searches in non-emergency situations;"9 hiring staff
previously convicted of unlawfully beating inmates;'a withholding medication
from an inmate known to be HIV-positive;nl confining an inmate in a strip cell
for approximately twenty days, where he wrapped himself in toilet paper to keep
function "smoothly." Perhaps the question should not be whether a particular court
intervention on behalf of prisoners was "successful," but whether it made a positive
contribution to prisoners' lives or to prison administration. Even to answer this question,
however, will be difficult particularly when there will be disagreement about which
organizational changes - for example, improved programs, free correspondence policy,
a better warden, lower guard morale - can be attributed to a particular court
intervention ....
JACOBS, NEw PEnspFcrvEs, supra note 120, at 53.
216. See, e.g., ROBERT JOHNSON, HARD TiME 4 (2d ed. 1996) ("Mhe prison has been a source of
mostly gratuitous and destructive pain, offering not so much a lesson in civilization as an exercise in
abuse and neglect."); EDWARD P. SBARBARO & ROBERT L L-U1 R, PRISON CRISIS: CRmCAL READINGS
8 (1995) ("If the correction of behavior is the purpose of incarceration, then, one would be hard-pressed
to fabricate a situation worse than prison to accomplish this purpose."); James E. Robertson, Houses of
the Dead: Warehouse Prisons, Paradigm Change, and the Supreme Court, 34 Hous. L. REV. 1003, 1031
(1997) ("In sharp contrast to the lofty aspirations of its founders, the prison of the 1990s is deemed
successful if it stores and degrades offenders under a regime of idleness."); Sturm, supra note 215, at
687-88 (observing that prison conditions in many facilities threaten inmate health and safety); Paul
Wright & Dan Pens, Prison Legal News's Top Ten Non-Frivolous Prisoner Lawsuits, in THE CELUNO
OF AMERICA 58, 58-61 (Daniel Burton-Rose et al. eds., 1998) (summarizing judicial findings of poor
sanitary conditions, overcrowding, poor medical care, and shocking acts of violence by inmates and
staff). But see RICHARD A. WRIGHT, IN DEFENSE OF PRISONS (1994) (arguing that the prison deters and
incapacitates, but fails to achieve other correctional goals, i.e., rehabilitation, retribution, and social
solidarity).
217. Norval Morris, The Contemporary Prison, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON 227
(Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995).
218. See Wright & Pens, supra note 216, at 58-61 (summarizing judicial findings of poor sanitary
conditions, overcrowding, poor medical care, and shocking acts of violence by inmates and staff); c.
Sturm, supra note 215, at 687-88 (observing that prison conditions in many facilities threaten inmate
health and safety).
219. See Moore v. Carwell, 168 F.3d 234, 236-37 (5th Cir. 1999).
220. See Kesler v. King, 29 F. Supp. 2d 356, 360-61 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
221. See McNally v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 671, 674 (D. Me. 1998).
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warm; m and crowding of up to 190 inmates in a facility designed for fifty-one
persons. "' And while judicial intervention has remedied many abuses, the end of
judicial oversight often results in backsliding.e
Several factors contribute to the malignancy that grows seemingly unchecked
within the prison when unattended by the courts. First, prisons are "closed
institutions,"' hidden from public scrutiny.' Oversight of prisons by a public
body is thus unlikely.' In the absence of judicial scrutiny, the keepers of inmates
possess extensive discretion and authority and are as corrupted by power as other
government agents.
Second, the "pains of imprisonment"m primarily assault an inmate's sense of
competence and worth, leaving him or her adrift in a prison community that prizes
toughness, violence, and exploitation. As I observed in a previous article:
The loss of liberty, aside from its constraint on physical movement, cuts
a deep psychological wound because it "represents a deliberate, moral
rejection of the criminal by the free community." Severe restrictions on
goods and services constitute an attack on "an individual's self-image"
in that poverty symbolizes "personal inadequacy." Deprivation- of
heterosexual relationships brings into question one's "ego image" given
the cultural nexus between sexual prowess and manliness. The many
prison rules that deny individual autonomy symbolize a return to "the
weak, helpless, dependent status of childhood." Finally, the danger of
assault by predatory inmates represents an ongoing challenge to one's
manhood because the inmate society equates "toughness" with mas-
culinity.
Finally, because inmates are demonizedtm  impoverished,"l disenfran-
222. See Young v. Breeding, 929 F. Supp. 1103, 1108-09 (N.D. III. 1996).
223. See Carty v. Farrelly, 957 F. Supp. 727, 735 n.10 (D.V.1. 1997).
224. See CARRO L, supra note 215, at 8 (finding "considerable evidence of backsliding when active
[judicial] involvement ends").
225. MICHAEL WELCH, PUNiSHMENT IN AMERICA 189 (1999) (emphasis omitted).
226. See Robertson, supra note 216, at 1016 (observing that "imprisonment is a hidden penalty
because the state removes punishment from public view") (footnote omitted); see also LUCiEN X.
LOMBARDO, GUARDS IMpIisONED 30-31 (1989) (discussing "[tihe [i]nvisibility of the [pirison," in which
even prospective correctional officers knew little about prisons even though some of their fathers worked
in prison).
227. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,353-54 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (asserting that
the legislative and executive branches, "entrusted in the first instance" with the well being of inmates,
had permitted conditions of confinement in nearly half the states to violate the Eighth Amendment).
228. Sykes, supra note 200, at 65-78 (delineating restrictions on liberty, goods and services,
heterosexual relationships, autonomy, and safety as the "pains of imprisonment," i.e., deprivations
experienced by most inmates).
229. Robertson, supra note 216, at 1019-20 (footnote omitted).
230. See IRWIN & AUSTIN, supra note 29, at 80 (describing inmates as "among society's leading
pariahs"); George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Uses of
Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1895, 1898 (1999) (contending that felons are "the untouchable class of
American society").
231. About one-half of inmates free for a year or more before their arrest reported incomes under
2000]
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chised, "m and largely drawn from the underclass, "3 their suffering is unlikely to
arouse external protest. T Indeed, "inmates may be the least sympathetic group of
outsiders' in our constitutional jurisprudence."''
V. Revisiting Stateville
Jacobs has argued that the bureaucratization of the American prison and the
expansion of inmates' rights share a common etiology - the extension of the "mass
society."' Derived from the writings of Edward Shills, the "mass society" thesis
asserted that groups historically at the margins of society have been integrated into
"society's central institutional and value systems."' This has come about by virtue
of a "heightened sensitivity on the part of the elite to the dignity and humanity of
the masses.""5 "Fundamental to the realization of a mass society," wrote Jacobs,
"is the extension of the rights of citizenship to heretofore marginal groups like racial
minorities, the poor, and the incarcerated."n9
Consistent with the "mass society" thesis, some fifty years ago the Sixth Circuit
in Coffin v. Reichard' first posited that "a prisoner retains all the rights of an
ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him
by law."" Nonetheless, lower federal courts would not repudiate the hands-off
doctrine until the late 1960s. Inmates' rights then rapidly expanded until the
Supreme Court's ruling in Bell v. Wolflsh' in 1979. Ironically, the Wolfish Court
halted the growth of inmates' rights through the caveat in Coffin - those so-called
"necessary" restrictions, which the Court has found embedded in its social
construction of the prison. 3
This Article contends that Jacobs got it wrong. The bureaucratic prison's origins
do not lie in an emergent, inclusive "mass society," but in a legitimation crisis.
$10,000; 19% reported incomes less than $3000. See JEFFREY REIMAN, THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE
POOR GET PRISON 102, 135 (5th ed. 1998).
232. With the exception of Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont, all states bar
imprisoned felons from voting. See Fletcher, supra note 230, at 1898.
233. See Leo Carroll, Race, Ethnicity, and the Social Order of the Prison, in THE PAINS OF
IMPRISONMENT 181, 182 (Robert Johnson & Hans Toch eds., 1988) (identifying "most" minority inmates
as former "residents of ghettos").
234. See Transcript: The Goldwater Institute and the Federalist Society: Federalism and Judicial
Mandates, 28 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 17, 30-31 (1996) (describing inmates as one of the "other discrete and
insular minorities" in that "prisoners ... will get no protection from the political process").
235. Pamela S. Karlan, Bringing Compassion Into the Province of Judging: Justice Blackmun and
the Outsiders, 71 N.D. L. REv. 173, 176 (1995); see also IRWIN & AUSTIN, supra note 29, at 80
(describing inmates as "among society's leading pariahs" and describing inmates as "the least sympathetic
group of 'outsiders' in our constitutional jurisprudence").
236. See JACOBS, STATEVILLE, supra note 18, at 5-6, 203-07.
237. Id. at 6.
238. Id.
239. Id
240. 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
241. Id. at 445.
242. See supra notes 149-57 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the Bell decision).
243. Coffin. 143 F.2d at 445.
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Having embraced the rehabilitative ideal,' correctional authorities could not
reconcile often deplorable penal conditions with its ideological rhetoric.us Whereas
a similar penal crises a hundred years earlier was mitigated by a commitment to a
new, professional penology and to the reformatory movement,' this one was
resolved by "rights talk."
Feeley and Simon in their seminal study of prison reform by judicial decree
conceptualized rights talk as a three-stage process of dissonance, integration, and
coordinationm 7 Dissonance, or crisis, arose because of the gap between the
rehabilitative ideal and the actual conditions of confinement, particularly those in
the South, where prison conditions resembled those of the slave plantation" In
the integration stage, judges expressed their disapproval of prison conditions through
the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.2" The final
stage, coordination, involved the institutional commitment of judges to creating a
"legally justifiable prison."'
The prisoners' rights movement soon encountered the Burger Court. Its
enunciation of the rational-basis test introduced a value-passive constitutional
rhetoric. Unlike the stinging rebuke of prison life found in landmark lower court
decisions such as Holt v. Sarver,"3 ' the Burger Court advanced a deferential
analysis that recast the parties: prison staff were no longer ill-trained brutes, but
seasoned professionals; inmates, on the other hand, became conniving, violent
outlaws. By 1980, rights talk became a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it would
legitimate judicial intervention as a means of ameliorating the worst of penal
abuses; on the other hand, it would legitimate the prison as a lawful institution, in
which humane, seasoned professionals faced dangerous offenders.
As evidenced by the dramatic growth of the prison population for the past two
decades, the Court's toothless rational-basis scrutiny has restored the legitimacy of
the prison. In 1980, prisons held 315,974 persons;-, by 1998 the total number of
sentenced prisoners exceeded 1,300,000.2"
244. See Allen, supra note 151, at 226-27 (defining rehabilitative ideal).
245. See supra notes 83-86 (discussing prison conditions during the hands-off doctrine).
246. See MICHAEL SHERMAN & GORDON HAWKINS, IMPRISONMENT IN AMERICA 67 (1981) ("Faced
with 'glaring institutional abuse' the Americans simply 'came up with a new design' in the form of a new
theory of the Reformatory and a successful effort to find money to build it.") (footnote omitted); LARRY
E. SULLIVAN, THE PRISON REFORM MOVEMENT 16-17 (1990) (chronicling the advent of the professional
penologist).
247. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN
STATE 204-96 (1998).
248. See id. at 150-58.
249. See id. at 206.
250. See id at 239.
251. 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970) ("For the ordinary convict a sentence to the Arkansas
Penitentiary amounts to banishment from civilized society to a dark and evil world completely alien to
the free world.") (emphasis added), affafd 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
252. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 87, at 490 tbl.6.35.
253. See ALLEN J. BECK & CHRISTOPHER J. MUMA, PRISONERS IN 1998, at 2 tbl.l (Aug. 1999).
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This growth, however, cannot be attributed to a renewed faith in rehabilitation.
Policy makers have embraced a "new" penology, which the courts have allowed to
function free of significant constitutional constraints. Unlike the old, traditional
penology, "the [new penology] does not speak of impaired individuals in need of
treatment or of morally irresponsible persons who need to be held accountable for
their actions. Rather... it pursues systemic rationality and efficiency."'
Beneath the sanitized exterior of the new penology lies a correctional system that
manages the underclass - the social junk of advanced capitalism." The criminal
justice system has long targeted this lumpenproletariate occupying the inner city by
virtue of their criminality, deviance, race, and perhaps mostly their class.' In the
past, however, the rehabilitative ideal deflected criticism of a class-oriented crime
control policy. Presently, the bureaucratized prison and its constitutional edifice -
the rational-basis test - perform the same defensive function once born by the
rehabilitative ideal. Their success made possible a new type of prison, the
warehouse prison.
The warehouse prison confines offenders in a manner not unlike the housing of
livestock:
Warehouse prisons, with or without occasional creature comforts, are
empty enterprises. Mostly, they squander human potential ....
Warehouse prisons offer an existence, not a life. Their inhabitants
survive rather than live. Warehouse prisons are our modem day houses
of the dead, to draw on Dostoyevsky, not because of brutality but
because of inertia. They provide some comforts but they are not
comfortable. They don't instruct or correct. They merely contain.'
Stripped of even the pretense of rehabilitation, warehouse prisons operate as storage
facilities. They provide inmates with the bare necessities of life and thus satisfy the
254. Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy
of Corrections and Its Inplications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 452 (1992).
255. See, e.g., id. at 455 ("The term underclass is used today to characterize a segment of society
that is viewed as permanently excluded from social mobility and economic integration. The term is used
to refer to a largely black and Hispanic population living in concentrated zones of poverty in central
cities, separated physically and institutionally from the suburban locus of mainstream social and
economic life in America."); Hans Toch, Studying and Reducing Stress, in THE PAIN.S OF IMPISONMENT
25, 41 (Robert Johnson & Hans Toch eds., 1988); see also Morris, supra note 217, at 2.
256. See, e.g., REIMAN, supra note 231, at 134 (contending that "the criminal justice system works
systematically not to punish and confine the dangerous and the criminal but to punish and confine the
poor who are dangerous and criminal"); JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE 254 (1993) (arguing that
the introduction of probation and parole at the turn of the last century arose from a desire to control the
"dangerous classes"); WEL , supra note 23, at 35 (discussing the interrelationship between race and
class and observing that together they "determine the form and degree of punishment").
257. JOHNSON, supra note 216, at 7-8; see also Robertson, supra note 216, at 1026-36 (delineating
the origins and symbolic functions of warehousing inmates).
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Supreme Courts minimalist notion of civilized confinement,"8 but they do little
else. Inmates are abandoned to "do time" without constructive activities.
VI. Reconstructing Prisoners' Rights
A theory of rights applicable to prison should be built around three operational
principles. First, the criminal justice system should not resort to imprisonment as
the normative sanction for a serious crime. Second, when imprisonment does
become necessary, it ought to entail the fewest restrictions compatible with
institutional safety. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we should embrace a
new penal philosophy - one based on restorative justice.
A. A Reputable Presumption Against Incarceration
A majority of inmates do not pose a sufficient threat to the community to justify
the loss of liberty born from incarceration. Jerome Miller observed that in 68% of
violent crimes the victim sustains no injury and just over 1% result in one or more
days of victim hospitalization. ° Moreover, John Irwin and James Austin placed
52.6% of the crimes leading to imprisonment in the "petty categories," in which
there is no significant loss of money and/or injury.
As former judge Lois Forer explained in recommending non-incarceral sentences
for nonviolent offenders, "Fines, restitution, reparations, loss of licenses, and
penalties other than prison are satisfactory in most cases [of criminality]. They
compensate victims; they uphold the law; sometimes they act as a deterrent."' a
Moreover, depopulating prisons may enhance public safety because prison officials
will no longer prematurely release violent offenders to relieve prison overcrow-
ding.'
Previous law review commentary has advanced two constitutional grounds for a
presumption against imprisonment. Richard G. Singer argued that the Eighth
Amendment ban on sentences grossly disproportionate to the crime rendered
imprisonment for nonviolent offenders constitutionally suspect.' Recently, Sherry
258. Compare Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981) (indicating that prison staff must
provide "essential food, medical care, and sanitation" but need not go so far as to rehabilitate offenders),
with HANS TocH, LIVING IN PRISON 21-22 (1992) (setting forth his Prison Preference Inventory, which
consists of privacy, safety, structure, support, emotional feedback, social stimulation, activity, and
freedom).
259. Overcrowding provides a gauge of warehousing. Thirty-two states operated prison above 100%
of their capacity. The federal prison system operated at 127% of its capacity. See BECK & MUMOLA,
supra note 253, at 8 tbl.9. Inmate unemployment constitutes another measure of warehousing. Prisons
employ under 10% of the inmate population. Gregory A. Clark, Work Programs, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN PRISONS 508, 509 (Marilyn D. McShane & Frank P. Williams III eds., 1996).
260. JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AN DESTROY 33 (1996).
261. See BECK & MUMOLA, supra note 253, at 11 (finding that of sentenced state prisoners; 47%
were confined for violent offenses; 22% for property offenses; 21% for drug offenses; and 10% for
public order offenses)
262. Louis G. FORER, A RAGE TO PUNISH 95 (1994).
263. Jeff Potts, American Penal Institutions and Two Alternative Proposals for Punishment, 34 S.
Tax. L. REv. 443, 513 (1993).
264. See Singer, supra note 100, at 3-12. See generally Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381
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F. Colb contended that the Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska" recognized
freedom from confinement as a fundamental right.' Alternatives to incarceration
would thus occupy a preferred status."
When should imprisonment occur in light of this critique? Norval Morris and
Michael Tonry contend that one or more of the following should be present to
render imprisonment an appropriate sanction:
-Any lesser punishment would depreciate the seriousness of the crime or crimes
committed.
* Imprisonment is necessary for deterrence, general, or special.
* Other less restrictive sanctions have been frequently or recently applied to this
offender.'
B. Maximizing Inmate Liberty
This Article posits that offenders go to prison as punishment, not for punishment.
Institutionalization and its inherent deprivations are punishment enough. Indeed,
confinement can have a dehabilitating effect on some offenders:
Everyday in prisons and jails across the USA, the human rights of
prisoners are violated. In many facilities, violence is endemic. In some
cases, guards fail to stop inmates assaulting each other. In others, guards
are themselves the abusers, subjecting their inmates to beatings and
sexual abuse. Prisons and jails use mechanical, chemical and
electroshock methods of restraint that are cruel, degrading and
sometimes life-threateningYm
Consequently, conditions of confinement should be no more restrictive than
needed to safeguard the public, staff, and the inmates themselves. David Fogel, a
former director of corrections in Minnesota and Illinois, recommended that "[a]ll the
rights accorded free citizens consistent with mass living and the execution of a
(1910) (holding that punishments grossly disproportionate to the crime inflict cruel and unusual
punishment).
265. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
266. Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different from All Other
Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L R v. 781, 787-88 (1994).
267. See id. at 820-48. Commentators in other forums have embraced this stance. See FORER, supra
note 262, at 95 (1994) (recommending alternative sanctions for nonviolent offenders); IRWIN & AUSTIN,
supra note 29, at 70 (arguing that large-scale incarceration wastes resources); JOHNSON, supra note 216,
at 293 (asserting that community settings can better achieve correctional goals for most offenders than
incarceration); Mark A.R. Kleiman, Community Corrections as the Front Line in Crime Control, 46
UCLA L. REv. 1909passim (1999) (criticizing the overuse of prison and the underfunding of community
corrections). See generally M. Kay Harris, Reducing Prison Crowding and Nonprison Penalties, 478
ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL & Soc. Sc. 150, 159 (1985) (lamenting that alternatives to incarceration are
approached in a "laissez-faire, laundry-list" style, when their use should be part of a "significant
rethinking" of penal policy).
268. NORvAL MoRRis & MICHAEL TONRY, BEWrEEN PRISON AND PROBATION 12-13 (1990).
269. See Sykes, supra note 200, at 65-78 (delineating the "pains of imprisonment").
270. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNrrE STATES OF AMERICA - Roms FOR ALL 55 (1998).
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sentence restricting freedom of movement should follow a prisoner into prison. ' '7 '
Many prison rules currently fail this test:
[P]rison disciplinary codes often transcend the criminal law, regulating
every aspect of the lives of inmates. They punish trivial, innocuous
conduct. Therefore, prisoners perceive the prison disciplinary process
as unfair. Overregulating or overcriminalizing within prison is
counterproductive, encouraging selective enforcement of the rules. This
allows guards to maintain control through favoritism. The rules
themselves become inducements to violations, for their literal enfor-
cement would reduce prisoners to automatons ....
We should make far greater use of open-prisons. They seek to limit the gulf
separating imprisonment from the free world by maximizing inmate freedoms and
responsibilities. Consequently, daily life in an open-prison is not a radical departure
from life outside prison: inmates in open-prisons enjoy extensive contact with the
outside world; they participate in the governance of the prison; and their incar-
ceration rarely extends beyond one year.'
C. A New Paradigm
The vulnerability of inmates to state-sanctioned harm arises from the dominant
incarceral paradigmY 4 In this paradigm, the state - not the victim nor the
community for that matter - claims the authority and right to inflict harm on
offenders. The resulting power imbalance has left inmates at the mercy of state
271. DAVID FOGEL," ... WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF..." 33 (2d ed. 1979). The doctrine has been
applied to a variety of subjects. See, e.g., Richard G. Singer, Sending Men to Prison: Constitutional
Aspects of Adjudication, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REV. 971 (1974) (applying the doctrine to
legislation); Richard G. Singer, Sending Men to Prison: Constitutional Aspects of the Burden of Proof
and the Doctrine of the Least Drastic Alternative as Applied to Sentencing Determinations, 58 CORNELL
L. REV. 51 (1972) (applying the doctrine to sentencing).
272. Bruce R. Jacob & K.M. Sharma, Disciplinary and Punitive Transfer Decisions and Due
Process Values in the American Correctional System, 12 STEmsON L. REv. 1, 22-23 (1982); cf. James
E. Robertson, "Catchall" Prison Rules and the Courts: A Study of Judicial Review of Prison Justice, 14
ST. Louis U. PUn. L. REv. 153, 170-72 (1994) (documenting various types of "catchall" prison rules).
273. See WILLIAM L. SELKE, PRISONS IN CRISIS 85 (1993) (describing the characteristics of open-
prisons).
274. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PNISHMmENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 77
(1993) ("[Llocking people up is the primary tool for punishing serious offenders.... Ultimately, the
prison became the centerpiece of correctional theory."); Robert Johnson, Preface to THE PAINS OF
IMPRISONMENT 11, 11 (Robert Johnson & Hans Toch eds., 1988) (observing that "prisons have come to
be synonymous with punishment in the modern mind"); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions
Mean?, 63 U. Cm. L. REV. 591,591 (1996) ("[Igor those who commit serious criminal offenses, the law
strongly prefers one form of suffering - the deprivation of liberty - to the near exclusion of all
others.").
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power.' Inmates have looked to the courts as a counterweight."' Toward this
end, the judiciary has achieved favorable but qualified results.'m
Advocates of the humane treatment of inmates must look beyond litigation and
advance alternative models of penality. They should weigh the merits of proffered
paradigms by the following criterion: is offender autonomy maximized without
diminishing the accountability of offenders to their victims and immediate
communities?
Recently, several commentators have advanced the restorative justice
philosophyfm Its appeal to inmates lies in several of its unorthodox tenets. First,
crime is no longer defined solely as an injury to the state but also as an act of harm
directed toward the victim, community, government, and offender.27 The offender
is deemed responsible for his crime within a framework of antecedent causes, which
precludes his criminality from becoming his master status.2
Second, the restorative justice ideal posits a new goal of punishment - the
offender's direct accountability to both victim and community."' This is to be
275. Professor Todd R. Clear remarks, "We should be suspicious about the uses of punishment,
because allowing government to intentionally damage the well-being of some of its citizens is inherently
questionable." TODD R. CLEAR, HARM IN AMERICAN PENOLOGY 171 (1994).
276. See WAYNE N. WELSH, COUNTIES IN COURT 15 (1995) ("Because inmates lack political power,
litigation may be the only way to create and implement basic prisoner rights.").
277. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of judicial intervention).
278. See, e.g., HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENsEs 177-214 (1995) (advancing restorative justice as
anew way of viewing criminal justice); Gordon Bazemore & Dennis Maloney, Rehabilitating Community
Service: Toward Restorative Service Sanctions in a Balanced System, in CORRECTIONAL CONTEXTS 401,
402 (James W. Marquart & Jonathan R. Sorensen eds., 1997) (arguing that the restorative justice
paradigm "as a sanctioning focus" will bring new vitality to community service sentences); Myron Steele
& Thomas R. Quinn, Restorative Justice, in THE DILEMMAS OF CORRECTIONs 524, 526-32 (Kenneth C.
Haas & Geoffrey P. Alpert eds., 3d ed. 1995) (discussing the emergence of the restorative justice
paradigm and arguing that sanctions based on this paradigm will be effective). See generally FRANK
SCHMAI.EGER, CRIMINAL JUsTICE TODAY 410 tbl. 10-3 (annotated instructor's 5th ed. 1999) (comparing
restorative and retributive justice). Criticism of the restorative justice paradigm include: (I) that it rests
on a consensus notion of law-making in contradistinction to the role of conflict; and (2) that it functions
as a means of "coercive social control" much like the extant justice system. Kevin I. Minor & J.T.
Morrison, A Theoretical Study and Critique of Restorative Justice, in REsToRATIVE JUSTICE:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 117, 129-30 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1996).
279. Howard Zehr, arguably the foremost advocate of restorative justice, contended:
Crime represents an injury to the victim but it may also involve injury to the offender.
Much crime grows out of injury. Many offenders have experienced abuse as children.
Many lack the skills and training that make meaningful jobs and lives possible. For many,
crime is a way of crying for help in part because of the harm done to them.
ZEHR, supra note 278, at 182; see also Daniel W. Van Ness, Restorative Justice and International
Human Rights, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 21, 23-24 (Burt Galaway &
Joe Hudson eds., 1996) (arguing that alongside the injuries suffered by the victim and community,
offenders experience injuries "that existed prior to the crime and that in some way may have prompted
the criminal conduct of the offender").
280. "Master status" is status that "override[s] all other statuses .... " HOWARD S. BECKER,
OUTSIDERS 33 (1966).
281. See, e.g., ZEHR, supra note 278, at 200-03 (discussing the several dimensions of accountability
in the restorative justice paradigm); Paul McCold, Restorative Justice and the Role of the Community,
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achieved via the offender's reparation to the victim, service to the community, and
appreciation of the reasons for his criminality.z Thus, restorative justice seeks to
make victims whole again.
Finally and most importantly for inmates, restorative justice seeks to reconcile
offender autonomy with offender accountability by subjecting adjudicated persons
to the least restrictive sanction that is consistent with community safety. 3 Toward
this end, proponents of restorative justice favor "intermediate," community-based
sanctions."
VII. Conclusion
Because inmates are both powerless and demonized,' their welfare rests largely
on the formulation, legitimatization, and implementation of a theory of inmate
rights. Only then can they cope with the deleterious nature of the contemporary
prison. One branch of government - the judiciary - has shown itself willing and
capable of formulating and legitimating a theory of inmate rights. The majoritarian
branches, in contrast, have demonstrated historic indifference to the welfare of
inmates unless prodded by the judicial branch. As one commentator observed:
Only after it became clear that no relief would be voluntarily
forthcoming were the federal courts dragged into prison reform. Judicial
activism was directly attributable to legislative and executive inaction.
The problem arose, of course, because these branches of state
government were unwilling, or unable, to devote scarce resources to the
improvement of correctional facilities.
Unfortunately, federal courts no longer take prisoners' rights seriously. Blame
rests squarely on the Supreme Court: it has advanced a lax, deferential standard in
propounding that the "[reasonableness] standard of review . . . applies in all
in RESToRATrvE JusncE: INTERNATONAL PERSFpcvEs 85, 87 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds.,
1996) ("Offenders do not need to be punished; they need to be held accountable [to the community]").
282. See, e.g., McCold, supra note 281, at 86-97 (describing the roles of the various parties in the
restorative justice paradigm); Mark Carey, Restorative Justice in Community Corrections, CORRECTIONS
TODAY, Aug. 1996, at 152, 152 (delineating the participants in the restorative justice paradigm);
Bazemore & Maloney, supra note 278, at 406-11 (discussing the relationship of the parties in the
restorative justice paradigm).
283. See WEsLEY CRAGG, THE PRACncE OF PumSHMENT TOwARDS A THEORY OF RESTORATIVE
JusTIcE 185-90 (1992) (arguing that sentencing should be guided by "the minimum force principle"
because persuasion rather than coercion should be central to sentencing).
284. See, e.g., ZEHR, supra note 278, at 93 (describing the restorative justice paradigm as one
seeking alternatives to imprisonment); Mark S. Urnbreit, Crime Victims Seeking Fairness, Not Revenge:
Toward Restorative Justice, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1989, at 52, 52 (stating that "[riather than the
imposition of severe punishment, restorative justice emphasizes restitution as a means of restoring both
parties").
285. See supra notes 237-42 and accompanying text (describing various attributes of the inmate
population, which leave it powerless and demonized).
286. Melvin Gutterman, The Contours of Eighth Amendment Prison Jurisprudence: Conditions of
Confinement, 48 SMU L. REV. 373, 399 (1995).
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circumstances in which the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional
rights. '2
7
This Article has argued that new criteria ought to govern judicial review of prison
rules. The alleged "reality" of life behind bars has become a self-fulfilling reality,
where the rule of the cruel thrives on a penal policy wedded to a failed and unjust
rationale for punishment.
287. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990) (emphasis added).
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